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DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND EUR/PRA
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TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):
(U) NEGOTIATOR MEETING WITH HER COUNTERPART, JANUARY 23,
2010

Classified By: Political M/C Susan Elliott. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and (h).

¶1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-008.

¶2. (U) Meeting Date: January 23, 2010
Times: 12:15 - 1:30 P.M.
Place: MFA, Moscow

Summary

¶3. (S) A/S Gottemoeller gave MFA DVBR Director Antonov a checklist of action items to be discussed during the next round of START Follow-On talks in Geneva (set to begin February 1) and said that she was positive about progress made during the January 22 meeting among CJCS Mullen, NSA Jones, and CHOD Makarov. Antonov complained that the U.S. was not taking seriously the GOR's concerns about U.S. missile defense plans. He also said U.S. plans to place Patriot training missiles in Poland was hurting the U.S.-Russia relationship. Despite these negative comments, Antonov and A/S Gottemoeller agreed that it should be possible to reach agreement on the new START treaty in four weeks or fewer.

A/S Gottemoeller Impressed by Progress

¶4. (S) A/S Gottemoeller passed to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov a checklist of items agreed during the meeting among CJCS Mullen, NSA Jones, and CHOD Makarov on January 22. (Note: This list is appended below at paragraph 11. End note.) They would all require action during the upcoming round of START Follow-On (SFO) talks in Geneva. She said she

was impressed by the progress made during the January 22 meeting. She was positive that draft Protocol language regarding telemetry that the U.S. conveyed to the Russian side on 18 January was agreed, with Russian changes. She said she looked forward to receiving the GOR's proposed additional language for the Protocol and an Annex on telemetry, which was to be provided in Geneva when the next round of talks opened on February 1.

15. (S) A/S Gottemoeller noted that the limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers, with the addition of deployed and non-deployed nuclear-equipped heavy bombers, would mean that the U.S. would have to eliminate more of its launchers than it originally planned, ensuring that the treaty would result in true reductions. She added that the U.S. now expected to see movement on the Unique Identifier (UID) issue from the Russian side, and stressed that U.S. agreement to count bombers in the launcher limit and to accept the Russian limit of 1550 on warheads was linked to the CJCS Mullen-CHOD Makarov agreement in principle on UIDs.

16. (S) A/S Gottemoeller noted the good discussion that Ted Warner had had with his Russian counterpart, Col Ilyin, on monitoring the elimination of ICMBs, SLBMs, and mobile ICBM launchers. The GOR is proposing to accumulate a substantial number of eliminated items (solid fuel ICBMs or SLBMs) over a six-month period. These eliminated items would have large holes cut in them to confirm elimination. They would be sent to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of conducting one of its eight Type 2 inspections of them. The U.S. would also have the option of conducting a Type 2 inspection of eliminated TELs. The details of these

arrangements will be negotiated in Geneva, and will be recorded in Section 7 of the Protocol.

Antonov Still Linking START and Missile Defense

17. (S) Antonov told A/S Gottemoeller that, even though CHOD Makarov did not raise the linkage between the SFO treaty and U.S. missile defense (MD) plans, it was still an issue that concerned him. He said that MD concerns influence "all the GOR does" regarding the treaty. Gottemoeller noted that in fact the U.S. delegation had noted that the MD issue had not arisen, and had commented on it. Antonov retorted that he had advised CHOD Makarov to raise the issue in plenary session, but he had said that he would instead take it up with Mullen in a one-on-one setting. Antonov confirmed that in fact CHOD Makarov had raised the issue in a one-on-one meeting with Mullen. He complained that the GOR accommodated the U.S. in its telemetry concerns, and that the U.S. was ignoring Russia's concerns about MD. "The U.S. will not remove brackets," he said. Antonov said this was causing people "behind the scenes" to direct local press to criticize him personally.

18. (S) A/S Gottemoeller argued that the U.S. had "come a long way" toward meeting GOR concerns about MD and she warned Antonov not to "crowd the treaty" with language about MD. She also argued that the U.S. was ready to talk to Russia about MD cooperation, but not within the framework of this treaty, which is about strategic offensive armaments. The U.S. had already offered a separate venue to talk about missile defense issues with Russia, and was ready to pursue a bilateral missile defense cooperation agreement. "Why do we get no answer to our proposals on this matter?" she asked.

Patriots Missiles in Poland

19. (S) Antonov said that U.S. plans to station a battery of Patriot training missiles in Poland were hurting U.S.-Russia relations by stoking a "The Russians are coming!" attitude in Poland. A/S Gottemoeller countered that NSA Jones had

suggested to CHOD Makarov during their lunchtime conversation that, if the GOR was concerned by these Patriot training missiles, Russia should take steps to increase joint military cooperation with the United States and Poland. This suggestion, however, was discounted. A/S Gottemoeller commented that the U.S. is open to working together with Russia and its neighbors to improve mutual confidence, but Russia needed to learn to cooperate better with NATO states.

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Agenda and Schedule for Upcoming Round of Talks
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¶10. (S) Turning to the checklist, Antonov commented that it looked correct to him, but of course he would have to check it with the technical experts on his negotiating team. A/S Gottemoeller acknowledged the point, and mentioned that U.S. and Russian conforming teams will continue their work in Geneva beginning on Thursday, January 28, with the goal of producing a new Joint Draft Text for the beginning of the new round on February 1. Antonov said that in his personal view, work on the treaty could be completed in Geneva within two weeks of February 1. A/S Gottemoeller replied that she thought that at least three weeks would be required. Antonov commented that if an agreement is not reached by February 28,

then the two sides should return to their respective capitals to take stock of the situation and get political guidance on how to proceed.

¶11. Checklist from NSA Jones-CJCS Mullen-CHOD Makarov Meeting, 22 January 2010:

--Telemetry. Draft protocol language that the U.S. conveyed to the Russian side on 18 January was agreed, with Russian changes. Russia proposing additional language for the Protocol and an Annex on telemetry, to be provided in Geneva when new round opens.

--Limit of 800 on Deployed and Non-Deployed Launchers. Agreed, with the addition of deployed and non-deployed nuclear-equipped heavy bombers.

--Counting one nuclear warhead for each nuclear-equipped heavy bomber: agreed.

--Central limit of 1550 warheads: agreed.

--UIDs. CHOD Makarov-CJCS Mullen agreement in principle; details in Treaty and Protocol to be negotiated and agreed in Geneva. (Note: U.S. agreement to counting bombers in the launcher limit and the 1550 limit on warheads is linked to the agreement in principle on UIDs.)

--Monitoring Elimination. Russia to accumulate a substantial number of eliminated items (solid fuel rocket motors) over a six-month period. These eliminated items would have large holes cut in them to confirm elimination. They would be sent to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of conducting a Type 2 inspection of them. The U.S. would also have the option of conducting a separate Type 2 inspection of eliminated TELs, which would be accumulated in batches at Pibanshur. For each of these facilities, Votkinsk and Pibanshur, the U.S. would have to option of conducting two Type 2 inspections per year, within the quota of eight Type 2 inspections annually. (The quota for Type 1 inspections is ten.) The details of these arrangements will be negotiated in Geneva, and will be recorded in Section 7 of the Protocol.

--New round will open in Geneva on February 1. U.S. and Russian conforming teams will continue their work in Geneva beginning on Thursday, January 28, with the goal of producing a new Joint Draft Text for the beginning of the new round on February 1.

¶12. (U) A/S Gottemoeller cleared this cable.

